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REASSESSING WHEAT CRISES
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THESSALONIKI*
Basil C. Gounaris
ABSTRACT: Wheat crises and local riots in eighteenth-century Thessaloniki are not unknown
to scholars. However, all the relative conclusions are based mostly on Svoronos’ and Iliadou’s
indexes rather than on additional research of primary sources. Therefore, much space has
been given to speculation and various issues have been left without proper examination. This
paper seeks to explore, through the study of the French consular correspondence, if there was
a common pattern in all wheat crises; why did not all crises develop into open revolts; and,
who were the basic participants in the making and management of the crises. It asserts that
the development of wheat shortages into popular riots was the outcome of local commercial
interests and calculated petty politics, not of famine.
The story of wheat crises in Ottoman-ruled Thessaloniki is not an untold one.
Svoronos made random reference to such events accompanied occasionally by
local riots. He also produced elaborate tables with the fluctuation of wheat
prices and exports in his now classic Le commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe siècle
(Paris, 1956).1 But he did not enter into a systematic discussion of the crises.
Partly based on Svoronos’ data is the extensive paper by Asdrachas on markets
and the price of wheat in eighteenth-century Thessaloniki and Patmos.2 His
main target was to correlate wheat market prices between the exporting East and
the importing West, namely Marseille. Although using scant evidence, he
suggested that the correlation between export and local market prices in
Thessaloniki was not significant, due to the mediation of the guilds and the
tariffs imposed on locally consumed goods. Guilds and tariffs were some of the
factors and mechanisms, he wrote, which regulated prices to such an extent that
historically documented shortages are not clearly reflected on price series.3
However, he did not enter into a more detailed discussion of other factors and
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* This paper has benefited from comments and amendments suggested by Prof. John
Alexandropoulos and Prof. John S. Koliopoulos, as well as by my friends and colleagues Dr
Dimitris Livanios and Dr Phokion Kotzageorgis. 
1 In this paper I have used the Greek translation: Nikos G. Svoronos, ∆Ô ÂÌﬁÚÈÔ ÙË˜
£ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜ ÙÔÓ 18Ô ·ÈÒÓ·, Athens 1996. 
2 Spyros I. Asdrachas, “Marchés et prix du blé en Grèce au XVIIIe siècle”, Südost-
Forschungen 31 (1972), pp. 178-209.
3 Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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mechanisms. Kostis used the example of Thessaloniki, especially of the 1740 and
1756 famines – to the extent that was possible through the indexes of Svoronos
and Iliadou –4 in order to examine whether food crises were the result of physical
phenomena or political constraints. He argued that war had exhausted local
supplies rather than bad crops; but the management and the magnitude of the
crises depended on circumstantial factors such as the possibility to attract
random imports by offering free market prices and the relevant interests of the
local janissary force.5 The important role of the janissaries in food crises as
leaders of the Thessaloniki mob – “unconvincing Robin Hoods” – is mentioned
by Mazower as well, who also stressed the division between the actual companies
of the guards and the local standing companies, janissaries in name only, petty-
traders and shopkeepers in reality.6 Both Kostis and Mazower were right in their
general remarks. But the story has never been told in detail and certain basic
questions still seek answers: Was there a common pattern in all wheat crises? If
there was, then why did they not all develop into open revolts? Was a serious
shortage of food a sufficient reason to cause the uprising of city dwellers against
the authorities? Who were the basic players in this game of political attrition?
What was the exact role of the foreigners, namely the French, who were the chief
exporters of wheat?  Such questions will be discussed in this paper.
The Making of the 1740 Famine
It was in late March 1738 when a fleet of some 30 light cargo ships (saiques)
reached the Bay of Thessaloniki to load large quantities of wheat and carry
them to Constantinople, which was already suffering from famine.7 At the
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4 N. G. Svoronos, Salonique et Cavalla (1686-1792), Paris 1951; Democratie Iliadou,
Inventaire des documents des Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille. Lemme
Salonique (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle), Thessaloniki 1981.
5 Kostas Kostis, ∞ÊÔÚ›·, ·ÎÚ›‚ÂÈ· Î·È Â›Ó·. √È ÎÚ›ÛÂÈ˜ ‰È·ÙÚÔÊ‹˜ ÛÙËÓ ÂÏÏËÓÈÎ‹ ¯ÂÚ-
ÛﬁÓËÛÔ (1650-1830). ¶ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ÚÔÛ¤ÁÁÈÛË˜ Î·È ÂÌÂÈÚÈÎ¤˜ ÂÓ‰Â›ÍÂÈ˜ [Scarcity, high
prices and famine: food crises in the Greek peninsula (1650-1830): problems of approach
and empirical indications], Athens 1993, pp. 108-115. See also Myrsini Athanasiadou,
∂ÌÔÚÈÎ¤˜ Û¯¤ÛÂÈ˜ £ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜-µÂÓÂÙ›·˜ Î·Ù¿ ÙÔÓ 18Ô ·ÈÒÓ· [Commercial relations
between Thessaloniki and Venice during the eighteenth century], Katerini 2006, pp. 357-
61, who simply quotes Asdrachas’ and Kostis’ comments. 
6 Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430-1950,
London 2004, pp. 102-104.
7 For an almost contemporary description of Thessaloniki (1734) by an eyewitness, see
Artemi Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, “¶ÂÚÈÁÚ·Ê‹ ÙË˜ £ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜ ÛÙ· 1734 ·ﬁ ÙÔÓ Père
Jean-Baptiste Souciet” [Description of Thessaloniki in 1734 by Father Jean-Baptiste
Souciet], Makedonika 8 (1968), pp. 185-209.
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same time a Dutch vessel was chartered to convey wheat from Barbary, the
northern African coast, to Larissa, where the janissaries had already been
ordered to assemble and march to the Austrian front against the forces of
Count Lothair Josef Königsegg. Just two months before harvest, army
provisions included quantities of wheat, which by then were indispensable for
the local population, struggling to make ends meet. The mission of the Dutch
vessel to Africa clearly shows that the resources of Thessaloniki had been
entirely drained. Indeed, we have evidence that the undue pressure exercised by
the deputy governor, Mehmet Pasha, upon the Christians of the Thessaloniki
kaza to deliver grain, means of transport, as well as cash, had brought them to
their knees. This was perhaps why conversion to Islam among them was
running so high during March of that year.8 In another letter the French
consul, Thomas de Jonville, explained that the shortage of grain and the high
prices were due not only to the provisioning of the capital and the increased
needs of the army stationed in the vicinity of Thessaloniki but also to the
cruelties perpetrated by the Ottomans against the “Greeks of Bulgaria and
Macedonia” since the recapturing of Nish in October 1737 by Grand Vizier
Ahmed Köprülü himself.9 All the villages – of an unknown area – had been
deserted and ample fields had not been sown.10 Such reasoning suggests that,
under normal circumstances, Thessaloniki might have expected supplies to
come from as far north as Skopje. In any case, the loading of the saiques was
prolonged for some six weeks, until 7 May, when they sailed for Constantinople
escorted by two heavily armed warships.11
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8 ANF [= Archives Nationales de France], B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki,
31 March 1738, ff. 35v-36v. See document 168 dated 22 March 1738 in Ioannis K.
Vasdravellis (ed.), πÛÙÔÚÈÎ¿ ·Ú¯Â›· ª·ÎÂ‰ÔÓ›·˜. ∞Ú¯Â›ÔÓ £ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜, 1695-1912
[Historical archives of Macedonia: the archive of Thessaloniki, 1695-1912], Vol. I,
Thessaloniki 1952, p. 218; Karl A. Roider, The Reluctant Ally: Austria’s Policy in the Austro-
Turkish War, 1737-1739, Baton Rouge 1972, pp. 135 ff. 
9 The term “Greek” is used by the French consuls, most of the time, to denote Greek-
Orthodox populations. For the details of recapturing Nish, see also Roider, The Reluctant
Ally, p. 113, and by the same author, Austria’s Eastern Question, 1700-1790, Princeton
1982, pp. 71-90.
10 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 21 April 1738, ff. 46v-47r. In a
previous document the enslaved Christian population in the town and district of Nish was
estimated at 25,000 women and children, let alone the heavy casualties of a mass slaughter;
see ANF, B1/994, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 18 November 1737, f. 337v. This
cruelty could be attributed to the activities of a “Greek merchant”, who had assembled 3000
men in the district of Skopje, at the time when Nish was besieged: ANF, B1/994, Thomas
to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 12 August 1737, f. 257r-v; cf. Svoronos, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, p. 50. 
11 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 26 April 1738, f. 52v, and 9
June 1738, f. 58v.
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It is reasonable to assume that the remaining weeks of May and June were
not very pleasant. By early July 1738 it was clear that the crop had been
abundant, but the prohibition of grain exports, imposed in 1723, was neither
lifted officially nor relaxed.12 The price of wheat was no less expensive than it
had been in December 1737, more than 50 paras per kile.13 It had dropped to
42 paras, by the time – in mid-August – the Porte sent the necessary capital to
collect in two months time 11,500 kile of wheat and 50,000 kile of barley and
to dispatch them to the capital. The price offered to producers was no more
than 20 paras per kile, which was an absolute disaster for them.14 Any prospect
for export vanished, as all policing measures were severely observed throughout
the Winter of 1738-1739. Prices, however, did not exceed 44-45 paras,
apparently due to the considerable stock already assembled in the city.15
This stock tempted the Sublime Porte. In mid-February 1739 a war vessel
escorted ten saiques to the Bay of Thessaloniki with orders to load additional
wheat for Constantinople.16 Two months later Thomas assigned a ship to
search the coast for wheat. It was soon to be followed by a few others; but they
all failed to find wheat less expensive than 55 paras per kile. By that time, in
late April, it had become obvious that the forthcoming crop was at risk. A note
from a local church codex mentions that snow fell on 1 April 1739 and frost
destroyed both grain fields and vineyards. It was followed by a drought. The
French consul prayed to God and he was not the only one to do so. Muslims
started public prayers too.17 For the time being God was on their side. In late
44 Basil C. Gounaris
12 Iliadou, Inventaire, p. 148. Illegal transactions were frequent and in fact taken for
granted by both wheat merchants and the aghas who controlled wheat trade; see Svoronos,
∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, pp. 310-314 and note 155 for official permissions in 1723 and 1745.
13 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 3 July 1738, f. 69v. From 1721
to 1740 the official tariff for export prices of wheat was 60 paras per kile (Svoronos, ∂Ìﬁ-
ÚÈÔ, p. 114).
14 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 28 August 1738, f. 108r.
Svoronos read “115 mille” instead of “11.5 mille” (Svoronos, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, p. 112, table 10).
Although the ishtira tax of Thessaloniki (including the regions of Yanitsa and Veroia) in the
late eighteenth century was 120,000 kile, it is somehow odd, given the defective sowing, that
the Porte might have asked for the maximum quantity. Still, considering what was to follow,
Svoronos may have been right to correct this low figure given in the document.
15 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 30 December 1738, f. 181v,
and 15 January 1739, f. 186v.
16 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 10 March 1739, f. 211v.
17 Sotirios Kissas, “∞ﬁ ÙËÓ ÈÛÙÔÚ›· ÙË˜ £ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜ ÛÙÔ 18Ô ·ÈÒÓ·. √ ¯·Ì¤ÓÔ˜
ÎÒ‰ÈÎ·˜ ÙÔ˘ ∞Á›Ô˘ ∫ˆÓÛÙ·ÓÙ›ÓÔ˘” [Fragments from the eighteenth-century history of
Thessaloniki: the lost codex of St Constantinos], Grigorios o Palamas 737 (1991), p. 254;
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May rain started to fall. It went on for more than a week, renewing hopes for
an abundant crop. Rain also saved the head of the local kad›, who was officially
in charge of price regulation and of exports abroad. Rumours had been
circulating that he had reserved the remaining grain to push its price upward
and thus gain extra profit for himself. Had it not been for the rain even sedition
was probable.18
Wheat prices, however, did not drop neither in June nor in July, when it was
realised that the crop was fairly abundant in the Kavala region, in present
Eastern Greek Macedonia, but less so in the Vardar (Axios) valley and in the
plains of Thessaly.19 In early August Thomas reported that, despite the
successful crop, extreme shortage kept the price as high as 50 paras per kile. He
complained that he had to send his dragoman ten times a day to the powerful
beys in order to secure the flour necessary for the hardtack which the local
French bakeries prepared for French crews. Although French export did take
place that year – I estimate some 12,800 kile –20 this time rumours pointed to
the local notables; they were widely suspected, very much like the kad› before
them, of hiding the reserves to achieve even higher prices.21 In the following
two months, although wheat sufficiency seemed to have been restored, prices
did not drop below 50 paras.22 The worst part was yet to come.
It is reasonable to assume that the kad› and the agha of the janissaries as well
the other principal aghas of Thessaloniki were aware that unless immediate
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ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 10 April 1739, f. 216v; 22 April 1739,
f. 238v; 17 May 1739, f. 242v.
18 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 28 May 1739, f. 275v. Instead
of the term kad› throughout the documents the term mollah is used, apparently as a sign of
courtesy for the judge. For the detailed duties of the kad› concerning wheat exports see N.
Todorov, ∏ ‚·ÏÎ·ÓÈÎ‹ ﬁÏË, 15Ô˜-19Ô˜ ·ÈÒÓ·˜ [The Balkan city, fifteenth-nineteenth
centuries], Vol. I, Athens 1986, pp. 144-46, and George Salakides, “The Provisioning of
Istanbul with Wheat in Turbulent Times: Yeniﬂehir in Thessaly at the End of the 18th
Century”, Balkan Studies 43/2 (2002), pp. 132-35. Exports were prohibited unless
permission by the kad› was granted for a specific quantity.
19 In fact there was one export of wheat from Kavala to Marseille in 1739 (Georgios
Koutzakiotis, L’échelle de Cavalla et l’arrière-pays au XVIIIe siècle. Commerce occidental et
notabilité ottomane, Ph.D. thesis, University of Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne 2004, p. 105).
20 See Svoronos, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, p. 312, table 18, where the total value of wheat exports from
Thessaloniki and its dependencies in 1739 is estimated at 16,000 piastres.
21 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 10 July 1739, ff. 293v-294r, and
3 August 1739, f. 304r-v. 
22 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 1 September 1739, f. 316v, and
15 October 1739, f. 333v.
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measures were taken their own heads would be at stake. It was just in 1720 that
the inhabitants of Larissa had sent off their kad› to Constantinople chained as
a criminal and had cut into pieces an agha who had dared to hide significant
quantities of wheat. That same year (1720) Muslim women and children
demonstrated in Thessaloniki asking their own kad› to distribute bread. He was
so frightened that he sought refuge in the quarters of his harem and from there
he directed the bakers accordingly.23 No one wanted such scenes to be repeated
in 1739. If the mob could not be appeased, then responsibilities had to be
shaken off. Therefore Monsieur Thomas, the French consul, was invited on 4
November to their quarters and was encouraged to ask the local French
merchants to send vessels to Syria, Anatolia or elsewhere to buy wheat. The
Ottoman officials were willing to offer a written guarantee that the wheat
purchased offshore would then be bought at a price higher than the local one
by a whole piastre. The French were not convinced and declined the offer.
Considering the aforementioned rumours against the powerful élite, the consul
thought, it was obvious that they had their own profit in mind rather than the
welfare of Thessaloniki. Apparently they would then sell their own supply at a
higher price, the same offered for the imported wheat loads. Thomas worried
that if things went wrong and the mission was in vain, then the Muslim
notables would put the blame on the French. Thus, in case of sedition, which
was not unlikely, the Francs would be the scapegoats. The consul suggested
instead that the aghas should charter French vessels, appoint trusted people
furnished with the necessary letters of reference, and then dispatch them all
around. The aghas refused. Thomas was convinced that in fact the whole set up
was to embarrass the French and denounce them altogether for the imminent
famine which only their avarice and lack of providence had caused. Then he
asked his colleagues – including de Peleran in Smyrna – to warn all French
vessels not to come to Thessaloniki without sufficient supplies of hardtack.
They were unlikely to find such a kind of supply there at reasonable prices, if
they were to find anything edible at all. Famine was at the gates of the city.24
According to Svoronos, one month later wheat was sold in Thessaloniki at
5.5 piastres per kile. In his adjacent table of prices it looks as if it had grown
more than fourfold in six weeks.25 But it had not. In the original French
46 Basil C. Gounaris
23 ANF, B1/991, de Boismont to the Regent, Thessaloniki, 4 May 1720, f. 186r-v. Cf.
Svoronos, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, p. 55.
24 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 6 November 1739, ff. 341r-
343v, and 12 November 1739, f. 350v.
25 Svoronos, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, pp. 112-113, table 10 in particular.
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document the measure is explicitly mentioned as “quillot de Salonique”, which
was four times heavier than the standard kile of Constantinople, already in use
by the French, as Svoronos himself mentioned. In any case, in early December
two French vessels, loaded with wheat from Syria, anchored in the Bay of
Thessaloniki. Thomas speedily approached the captains to clarify their
intentions. They both agreed that a price of 50 paras per kile would secure for
them an “honest profit”. He then informed the kad› and the agha of the
janissaries that, the current market price (prix fixé) being slightly more than 55
paras per kile, he had asked the French not to claim more than 52 paras. All the
notables were very much obliged by the offer and praised the French for being
such good friends of their empire; the two captains were no less obliged for the
unexpected bonus of ten aspra per kile, i.e. an extra four per cent profit.26
Apparently through the consulates news of quick profit spread rapidly in
the French commercial navy. In January two more vessels sold their cargo of
wheat at the Thessaloniki market at 50 paras per kile. French vessels also took
over the transportation of 25,000 kile of wheat from the vicinity of Kavala (the
Gulf of Orfanos, then known as the Gulf of Contessa) to Thessaloniki, initially
scheduled to meet army needs exclusively. The sultan, having signed with the
Austrians – in September 1739 – the victorious Treaty of Belgrade, had no
reason to reject the petition for assistance, which had been submitted by the
Thessaloniki notables.27 For a city with a population of some 60,000 and under
normal circumstances, 25,000 kile should have been sufficient for a couple of
weeks.28 The French continued to transport loads of wheat from Eastern
(present Greek) Macedonia or elsewhere throughout March, April and May,
but they were unable to create a surplus adequate to push prices downwards
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26 ANF, B1/995, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 5 December 1739, ff. 354v-
355v. All prices in this document referred to kile of Constantinople but have been calculated
accordingly to correspond to kile of Thessaloniki. The price offered to the French captains
by the consul was five piastres and two centimes. I think this figure should be written as “5.2
piasters” (624 aspra). If this is so – given that the net reduction is explicitly mentioned to
have been 40 aspra – then the local market price of wheat must have been 664 aspra per kile
of Constantinople or 55.3 paras per kile of Thessaloniki.
27 ANF, B1/996, Thomas to de Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 20 January 1740, f. 2v.
28 For the calculation see Evangelia Balta, “∆Ô „ˆÌ› ÛÙÔÓ ÂÏÏ·‰ÈÎﬁ ¯ÒÚÔ Î·Ù¿ ÙËÓ Ôıˆ-
Ì·ÓÈÎ‹ ÂÚ›Ô‰Ô” [Bread in Greek territory during the Ottoman period] in √ “¿ÚÙÔ˜ ËÌÒÓ”.
∞ﬁ ÙÔ ÛÈÙ¿ÚÈ ÛÙÔ „ˆÌ›. ∆ÚÈ‹ÌÂÚÔ ÂÚÁ·Û›·˜, ¶‹ÏÈÔ, 10-12 ∞ÚÈÏ›Ô˘ 1992 [“Our daily
bread”: from wheat to bread: a three-day conference, Mount Pelion, 10-12 April 1992],
Athens 1994, p. 242 and note 72.
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and relieve the poorer classes.29 In early April the forthcoming harvest looked
promising, but prices in the city fluctuated between 55 and 60 paras per kile.
What was even more important, circumstantial help could not eliminate the
risk of famine, which was running high all the time, threatening even the
wealthier classes. Misery was exceptional. The pasha was reluctant to accept the
terms suggested by certain “capitalists” in order to supply the city with wheat.
Apparently he did not wish to raise their margins of profit and thus to
accelerate a public outburst, when some French captains still found the current
prices profitable. Lacking flour, the bakeries of the British, the Venetian and the
Dutch consulates came to a standstill. The agony went on until mid-May, when
a final load from Panomi (modern Epanomi), a village in the vicinity with a sea
outlet, secured survival until the harvest. According to other unofficial sources
the final load of wheat arrived from Volos.30 The new crop of barley became
available to the city on the feast day of the Apostles, 30 June.31
Meanwhile, in late April a quantity of millet, which was kept at the
warehouses of the citadel, was used for the preparation of flour.32 If we consider
as reliable the testimony of Dimitrios Choidas,33 the consul of Venice, this kind
of “small millet” proved to be totally inappropriate: it caused fever. Another
codex note argues that it was not a matter of kind or size; the millet was simply
rotten because it was old. It was the worst bread that the city had experienced
since 1715, when the war versus Venice over the Peloponnese was at its most
critical stage. Deaths multiplied and went on for some months, but it is hard
to say whether the cause was food poisoning of an ill-fed population with
compromised health, fever and hunger or, most likely, judging from the figures,
the duration and the rate of deaths, some other epidemic disease. In any case,
according to the same note, the total death toll was 7511 inhabitants (3935
48 Basil C. Gounaris
29 This has nothing to do with the two fires which broke out in January and February
but demolished only some hostels and houses; see ANF, B1/996, Thomas to de Maurepas,
Thessaloniki, 13 February 1740, f. 32v, and 4 March 1740, f. 38r.
30 Constantinos Mertzios (ed.), ªÓËÌÂ›· Ì·ÎÂ‰ÔÓÈÎ‹˜ πÛÙÔÚ›·˜ [Monuments of Macedon-
ian history], Thessaloniki 1947, pp. 293-95 (April-May 1740). ANF, B1/996, Thomas to de
Maurepas, Thessaloniki, 14 April 1740, f. 45r; 6 May 1740, f. 54v; 23 May 1740, f. 58r.
Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos, πÛÙÔÚ›· ÙË˜ £ÂÛÛ·ÏÔÓ›ÎË˜, 316 .Ã.-1983 [History of Thessaloniki,
316 BC-1983], Thessaloniki 1983, p. 271 and note 1. 
31 Kissas, “∞ﬁ ÙËÓ ÈÛÙÔÚ›·”, p. 255.
32 Ibid., p. 271.
33 For the profiles of Choidas and of the other Venetian consuls, see Athanasiadou, ∂ÌÔ-
ÚÈÎ¤˜ Û¯¤ÛÂÈ˜, pp. 40-51.
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Jews, 2239 Muslims and 1337 Christians), i.e. more than one tenth of the total
population of the city.34
Many more people died every day on the outskirts of Thessaloniki. Prices
of wheat in the vicinity were rumoured to fluctuate between 150 and 250 paras
per kile. Although such high figures seem totally unrealistic – even the French
consul was reluctant to believe the rumours – they are verified by a most
unexpected source, the brief history in verse of the 1740 great famine, focused
on Macedonia and composed by a certain Michael from Gora. According to
Michael, from February to June 1740 the price of wheat was 27 aspra per okke,
i.e. some 190 paras per kile. His poetic composition also includes prices of other
goods, as well as shocking information about materials – earth included –
which were mixed with flour to produce bread, in the absence of any other
accessible food supply.35 According to a marginal note in a book of psalms from
Thessaloniki, a kile (apparently the 80 okke local one) of wheat cost 400 paras,
therefore the standard kile of Constantinople was around 100 paras.36 It is not
certain, however, if this was a Thessaloniki or some other local market price. In
any case, prices for local consumption, i.e. for the making of flour, were always
higher than those for export.37
Michael of Gora wrote that had it not been for the East and the West, which
had sent galleys with wheat, Macedonia would have lost its entire population.
Indeed, the French were unanimously recognised as the saviours of the city and
this was by no means an exaggeration. It was clear that there was no other
prospect of supply from adjacent areas since famine had also struck many other
places of the Greek peninsula. At the port of Volos, the outlet of Thessaly,
wheat prices were even higher. Shortage of provisions had caused a clamour for
bread even in Constantinople – then overcrowded with refugees – in April.38 In
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38 R. Olson, “Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Instanbul”, Journal of
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return for these vital and continuous services the pasha of Thessaloniki kept on
sending daily 100 okkes of good flour to the two French bakeries, which did
not interrupt their work for a single day. The pasha promised that even if there
was one kile of wheat left in Thessaloniki, he would share it with the French
Nation. After all Thessaloniki had escaped a much feared sedition that year
while the capital was just about to experience one. Thomas was proud to have
restored French prestige and no less satisfied with public acknowledgment. He
hoped that this obligation would not be soon forgotten and perhaps even more
that wheat exports to France would soon start up again.39 The latter proved
easier than the former. Fortunately the 1740 crop was fairly abundant. In late
August some French vessels had already been loaded at Volos and in Evia at 44
paras per kile. Exports resumed from Thessaloniki as well.40 The situation
returned to normal. 
More Crises
Thomas left Thessaloniki two years later, in 1743,41 so he did not have the
opportunity to test the durability of the public esteem for France. In mid-July
1753 the export trade of wheat to Italy, Provence and Spain was reported by
both the consuls of Venice and France to be the most active and considerable.
The price in June was as low as 31-32 paras per kile, and the new crop was very
rich.42 Fifty ships alone had departed for Spain. Some 120 ships had been
directed to Marseille and Livorno.43 The former consul, Pietro Choch,
estimated than no less than 200 vessels loaded with grain, almost all of them
French, had left during the past 16 months.44 In mid-August, while exports
were in progress, the mob of Thessaloniki rose because millers had been
permitted by the kad› to raise the price of flour half an asper per okke. It was
rumoured that he had been bribed along with the other officials who had
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permitted unlimited export of wheat. The representatives of the 24 guilds were
assembled and some suggested that the French should be blamed as the chief
responsible party for the increased prices. The more reasonable among them
responded that the French merchants loaded only what they had paid for; so
those who had favoured this trade in exchange for bribes were the true
instigators. The mollah, i.e. the honourable kad› or judge, and other officials
ran to hide themselves, pretty much like their predecessors had done in 1720,
and troubles were protracted for a few days. The loading of hardtack prepared
by the French bakeries was prohibited. The bakeries of Sweden, Venice, Naples,
Holland and Ragusa were razed to the ground. The two operating under
French auspices for some 20 years, as well as the British one, escaped the
menace, despite the evidence of the Venetian consul to the opposite. French
vessels were instructed to leave the bay. The supervisor of a French commercial
house, who had also served as an interpreter to the French captains, was
arrested by the mutineers and was detained to testify against those who had
permitted the loading.45
Due to an unexpected incident, the consul, de Clairambault, managed to
free the supervisor and to smooth his relations with the mutineers; but he failed
to have the imposed prohibitions revoked before the end of August. The wheat
trade had to stop for some time.46 If it was to restart in the foreseeable future,
he guessed, it would not be on a comparable scale. Meanwhile, according to the
testimony of Choch, the French had bribed the headman of the bakers to
threaten the mollah with yet a new uprising, if he permitted the reopening of
the other European bakeries. As long as they were closed, the French would
have had the monopoly of provisioning ships with hardtack.47
There were hopes, however, for return to normality, since both the kadı and
the janissary agha were awaiting their replacements. They had both been
discredited. The former had deliberately tried to direct the anger of the crowd
against the French. He had also obliged illegally the latter to plead himself
guilty of injustice. The trapped agha had promised to pay the cunning mollah
60 purses, in case the inquiry into the wheat exports proceeded. Indeed, the
inquiry was stopped after the mediation of various persons, not without
diminishing the prestige of the agha, who had tried to save both the mollah and
his own skin.48 The new agha arrived either in late September or early October
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and the prohibition was lifted.49 But, in spite of his eagerness, he also failed to
punish the top instigators. The janissaries rose violently against him, and the
city was thrown anew into terror.50
On 13 April 1755 de Clairambault left Thessaloniki with his family for
Smyrna and eventually for France. He was replaced temporarily by his deputy,
Pro-consul Fougasse, who promised to his minister all his zeal to preserve the
rights of the French Nation and its commercial interests.51 Fougasse’s efficiency
was soon to be put to the test. It was less than two weeks later that the mob of
Thessaloniki was in sedition due to a flour shortage, accusing the French of
having carried off their wheat and of using the best flour in town for their daily
bread and for the hardtack for their vessels. The janissaries headed the protests
targeting the French.52
This was by no means a surprise. The crop of 1754 was not a good one. It
was quite clear by late August that they would not make ends meet unless ships
were sent on time outside the gulf to search for additional wheat supplies,
which they did. However, “some” loads of wheat had been exported to
France.53 By December the price had sky-rocketed. The French were cautious
enough to observe the prohibition of wheat exports, for they knew that any
violation was bound to cause a local uprising against them. Prospects were
gloomy. Old grain that had been kept in stock went mouldy and the
forthcoming crop was reckoned to be a bad one, given the huge number of rats
which had inundated the fields. The population had been exhausted by the
plague which tormented the city from Spring to Autumn 1754.54 In April 1755
rains were scarce and made people even more pessimistic.
Fougasse did not hesitate to report from the start, very much like Thomas
had done before him, that the aghas of the country were responsible for the
shortage. They would not let the wheat enter the city unless they saw its price
peaking. But the priority for the mutasarr›f, Nouman Pasha Köprülü, the
governor, was to appease the outcry. According to Svoronos, he had already
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been exiled once for cruelty, so he had to be cautious.55 Therefore, in agreement
with the kad›, he detained the miller who provided flour to the French and
then ordered to have sealed both the mill and their two bakeries, in order to
force the French to taste the local bread. He also limited the quantity of
hardtack available to French ships down to one-fifth or -sixth of the usual.
Obviously he wanted to make an impression, but Fougasse was not impressed
at all. First he hurried to meet some of his friendly aghas and then the British
consul, Paradise, so as to join their forces in the same cause, to preserve their
bakeries. Then he met with the pasha. Nouman was honest enough to admit
the trick. He promised to restore French privileges as soon as he could, but for
the time being all the bakeries had to be shut down. He suggested instead that
the French bakers should go and work at his own bakery. Obviously he liked
their bread more and the same was true for the other Muslim notables. The
pro-consul assembled some of his fellow citizens and convinced them to take
the governor’s offer. He also convinced the British to join in, since their efforts
to keep their bakery running were to no avail. Paradise was also tempted. His
only condition was French bread to be forwarded daily to his house. Eventually
French bakers, with a daily provision of 50 okkes sent by Nouman Pasha’s
miller, took over the preparation of bread not only for the governor and for the
British but also for the Dutch, the Swedish, the Neapolitans, the Venetians of
Thessaloniki and, last but not least, for the kadı and the janissary agha, who
also asked for a share, most likely in addition to their own daily supply.56
On 30 April Nouman Pasha was deprived of his insignia, his property was
confiscated, and he was exiled to the island of Chios. The order had been issued
in mid-April together with a circular warning all officials that severe penalties
would be imposed on anybody who failed to dispense justice.57 As his successor
had not arrived yet, Abd-ul-rahman Agha, the local customs officer, acted as the
mütesellim, i.e. deputy governor.58 Fougasse, apparently alarmed, rushed to
make an appointment with him the following day, before his British colleague,
and to pay his compliments. He had just struck a good deal for his community,
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which he had to preserve. The two men met in the presence of the chiefs of the
esnafs and the aghas of the janissaries, who had all been invited to discuss the
food crisis. Before the official reception he deliberated privately with Abd-ul-
rahman in an adjacent room. The mütesellim expressed his bereavement for
being unable to provide the city with the necessary wheat before the next crop
and asked his advice. The French pro-consul replied that he could not ignore
the fact that wheat supplies were available in the nearby villages. All the
mütesellim had to do was to raise the price and tempt the landlords. When
Abd-ul-rahman said that he was afraid of the reaction of the crowd, Fougasse
suggested next that the acting governor should ask the permission of the Porte
to extract 50,000 kile of wheat from the quantity kept in the warehouses
officially assigned for the provisioning of the capital. It was a reasonable
demand since there was no shortage over there and harvest was approaching.
The mütesellim must have liked this proposal, for two days later he dispatched
two notables to Constantinople to submit the petition. However, for the time
being, he wanted more than advice from the French and apparently this was the
ultimate purpose of the private deliberation. He asked Fougasse and his
merchants to fetch a French ship with a small load of wheat as a gesture of good
will to the poor classes, who still held the French responsible for the shortage.
Otherwise he was afraid that, regardless of his personal good will, French
prestige would never be restored, insults would continue, and they might even
escalate to violent assaults. The pro-consul counter-suggested that the French
would contribute any vessel necessary if the mütesellim himself could supply
the capital. The Ottoman declined the compromise and stood by his proposal.
He even rejected the idea of the French sharing the burden with the Orthodox
and the Jewish communities. Obviously he wanted to shut some mouths – the
anti-French – in the next room without provoking the complaints of the
infidels. It was only the French interest, he said to the diplomat, he had in mind
after all. If the French covered all the expenses, they would exploit the
maximum feedback in terms of prestige and gratitude.59
Fougasse mustered his Nation anew: his second-in-command, Joseph
Roussel, and Messieurs Michel Tavernier, Joseph Langier and Antoine Ferand,
the last one representing the firm Ferand Brothers and Company. They decided
to send Captain Granier’s ship with a sum of 5000 piastres in search of wheat
around the archipelago. He was expected to buy at any price. The required
capital would be covered exclusively by the French commercial houses. In
return they had been permitted by the mütesellim to trade that wheat on their
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own terms. It is reasonable to assume that at a price of 50 paras per kile they
could buy some 80,000 okkes of wheat, enough to produce more than 100,000
okkes of bread. This was hardly enough for more than a few days, a week at the
most, under the circumstances. But buying time at any cost was exactly what
Abd-ul-rahman had in mind. The commercial house which was run by
Fougasse himself decided to send two ships in search of barley.60 The French
had all been convinced that it was in their best interests.
On 25 May none of the vessels had returned but no one seemed to worry
any more. The city was very quiet. Rain had refreshed the fields and the sultan
had granted permission to use the strategic supplies. Therefore the aghas who
had been keeping loads of wheat locked up outside Thessaloniki were
compelled to open up their stores and fetch them. Apparently prices were
dropping drastically and they were running out of time. Harvest was
imminent.61 When the French wheat arrived, guessed Fougasse, it would be
used to prepare hardtack for the crews. For the time being this prospect was not
an excuse for some French captains who had started wheat exports, already
embarrassing their Nation for the sake of their own interests.62 Captain Granier
sailed the Aegean Sea for two whole months without finding any wheat at all.
The whole venture had cost the French houses some 500 piastres but it was
worthwhile, thought the pro-consul. He was quite wrong.63
By the time Granier returned to Thessaloniki, in July, the situation had
changed. The 1755 crop eventually turned out to be a defective one. The French
were threatened daily to shut their bakery. Fougasse could hardly supply his
Nation with the daily flour. He had to employ all his friendly Ottoman
connections to avoid insults and humiliation. There was no prospect of wheat
exports to the West at all. Unless supplies arrived from elsewhere the situation
was not going to improve during Wintertime.64 The new pasha, also called
Nouman, who arrived during the Summer, was extremely aged and utterly
reluctant to abandon his pleasures and get actively involved in the food crisis.
The situation, according to the consul of Venice, was entirely in the hands of
the janissaries. Moreover, a general shortage of edible goods prevailed over the
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Aegean, which kept some 300 French ships anchored all around the Levant at
the time, were war against Britain to break out.65 The pasha died only a few
months later, in March 1756, at the age of 105, to be replaced immediately by
Topal Salam. He also did nothing to reduce wheat and other food prices,
regulated continuously according to the exclusive will of the janissaries. But no
riots were reported that year.66
In 1758 the same scenario was to be repeated in mid-July. After a rich
harvest the dwellers of Thessaloniki, furious with the increasing prices, revolted
against their mollah, whom they suspected yet one more time of having
favoured the export of undue quantities of wheat.67 They hunted him down in
his office but he had departed just in time to escape their rage. The building of
the magistrate was pillaged. His deputy (naibb) was stabbed several times but
he escaped death. The kad› reported the incident directly to the Porte. On 10
August the most severe orders came from the capital against the chief
insurgents. Three persons were convicted to death by strangulation, but the
janissaries managed to save them all. The mollah himself was exiled, as well as
the agha of the janissaries, for not being able to contain the rising in time.68
On another occasion, in 1789, the agha of the janissaries proved more
prudent than the kad›. In June of that year, before the harvest, extensive army
provisions seem to have caused a shortage. The mob rose and threatened to
murder the mollah, unless he took some measures. But he, instead of forcing
the aghas to open up their stores, where they kept abundant supplies waiting
for prices to climb, conveniently shut up all the European bakeries, except the
French one. Crews were in despair, but the mollah was not convinced by the
consuls to change his mind.69 In September of that year the crowd was irritated
once more by the loads – apparently excessive – of grain destined for the
capital. Suspecting once again that this trade was only to the profit of the local
authorities, they attacked both the kad› and the mufti. The former managed to
escape death by seeking shelter, like some of his predecessors, in his harem; but
56 Basil C. Gounaris
65 Mertzios, ªÓËÌÂ›·, p. 373 (14 October 1755); ANF, B1/999, Fougasse to de Machault,
Thessaloniki, 14 August 1755, f. 42r-v, and 13 September 1755, f. 50r-v.
66 Mertzios, ªÓËÌÂ›·, p. 374 (14 March 1756) and pp. 375-376 (13 April 1755).
67 In that year there was a shortage of wheat in Constantinople, which forced the
Peloponnese alone to send 70,000 kile (Kremmydas, ∂ÌﬁÚÈÔ, p. 81).
68 ANF, B1/999, d’Evant to de Moras, Thessaloniki, 20 August 1758, f. 146r-v, and 19
November 1758, f. 149r. Surprisingly, in another letter, signed by deputies Laugier and
Feraud, to the Chambre de Commerce in Marseille the crop was judged as “not a good one”
(Iliadou, Inventaire, p. 168). 
69 Mertzios, ªÓËÌÂ›·, pp. 446-47 (8 June 1789 and 8 September 1789).
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:04:24 |
the poor mufti was beaten up very severely, almost to death, and his beard was
pulled off by force. Angry janissaries opened mass fire against the houses of the
mollah and other officials. Then the “fearless” agha intervened at the head of
200 janissaries. He arrested the leaders of the mutiny and had them strangled
on the spot. The rest disappeared and public order was reinstated.70
Reassessment
The above-mentioned evidence, covering several occasions and decades during
the eighteenth century, allows for a far more detailed assessment of wheat crises
in Thessaloniki and, most likely, not only there. Although at first sight it looks
that the fate of the poor flock of the sultan was at the mercy of a few greedy
officials, a better inspection shows that the protagonists of the crises were many
more, while interests concerned networks of people rather than individuals.
There is no doubt that the mollah, the local judge, being the official regulator
of prices and exports, bore serious responsibilities. His key position permitted
him to make alliances with the janissaries, the guilds, the foreign consuls, with
some of them or with all of them, or, more often, to play one against the other;
especially if the pasha was absent or indifferent. It is also reasonable to assume
that some of the mollahs were greedier and less honest than others, open to
pecuniary offers and deals or even to some freshly baked loaves of French
bread.71 Trapped, however, between the conflicting interests of illegal exporters
(local beys and foreign captains), of millers, bakers and consumers, they were
easily framed and eventually handy scapegoats for the mob and alibis for the
central administration. Several of them were harassed, some were murdered;
the toll would have been higher had it not been for their harems. They were all,
one after the other, liable to bribery by many and suspected by all, worst by the
Porte itself. This is why their office was never renewed for a second year.72
As far as the Porte was concerned, neither the kad› nor the pasha were
untouchable. But evidence suggests that the latter and his acting-deputies were
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at least not liable to attacks by the mob; not that the pasha was irresponsible.
He could and indeed was expected to intervene and to take all the necessary
measures to alleviate distress, to exercise his authority in order for prices to be
reduced or to discuss extra measures. After all, only he could expect a second
year in office.73 His main field of interference, however, was diplomacy. The
pasha had the task of handling the foreign consuls with the stick and the carrot,
to the extent, of course, that this was feasible. The correspondence of the
French consuls is not the best source to study how foreign diplomats in general
were handled in practice. France was important par excellence to the Empire
for both economic and political reasons, and pashas did not have the luxury of
alienating French diplomats. Their alliance could be useful even to them
personally. Unfortunately the French were also the chief exporters of wheat
from Thessaloniki. The pasha had to strike a balance between the interests of
high diplomacy and the outcry of his flock against the Francs who were
carrying off their precious food. The standard way of approach was to reassure
the French of his personal feelings, restrict the operation of their bakeries
somehow, and promise to restore their privileges in due time; or make them pay
or suffer just a little bit, always for the sake of their own long-term commercial
interests rather than those of the pasha.74
The other puissants, or the powerful, involved in crises are not mentioned
by name or authority in the French and the Venetian documents. All the
officials bearing the title of agha and the captains of the janissaries were
certainly among them, the most prominent being the captain of the guard, that
is of the actual battleforce known, according to Vakalopoulos, as the 36th
company. He had also the title of çorbac›.75 Although the aghas were
58 Basil C. Gounaris
73 Loc. cit.
74 Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World around It, London and
New York 2007, pp. 146-147.
75 Vakalopoulos, πÛÙÔÚ›·, p. 281; Lascaris, Salonique, p. 20. Cf. the article on the ayans
of Eastern Greek Macedonia by Giorgos Koutzakiotis, “√È ÈÛ¯˘ÚÔ› ·ÁÈ¿ÓË‰Â˜ ÙË˜ ¢Ú¿Ì·˜,
ÙË˜ ∑›¯Ó·˜ Î·È ÙˆÓ ™ÂÚÚÒÓ (Ù¤ÏË 18Ô˘-·Ú¯¤˜ 19Ô˘ ·È.). ¶ÚÔÛˆÔÁÚ·ÊÈÎ¿ ÛÙÔÈ¯Â›· Î·È
Ì·ÚÙ˘Ú›Â˜ ÁÈ· ÙÔ ÚﬁÏÔ ÙÔ˘˜ ÛÙËÓ ÔÈÎÔÓÔÌ›· ÙË˜ ÂÚÈÔ¯‹˜” [The powerful ayans of Drama,
Zichna and Serres (late eighteenth-early nineteenth century): evidence and testimonies on
their personality and economic role in the region], H ¢Ú¿Ì· Î·È Ë ÂÚÈÔ¯‹ ÙË˜. πÛÙÔÚ›· Î·È
ÔÏÈÙÈÛÌﬁ˜ [Drama and its region: history and civilisation], Drama 2002, pp. 189-205. See
also the articles by Antonis Anastasopoulos, “The Mixed Elite of a Balkan Town”, in Antonis
Anastasopoulos (ed.), Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Rethymno 2005, pp. 259-
68, and “Lighting the Flame of Disorder: Ayan Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman
Karaferye, 1758-59”, International Journal of Turkish Studies 8/1-2 (2002), pp. 73-88.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:04:24 |
summoned to consult with the authorities at the peak of the crisis and some of
them represented esnafs, strictly speaking their role in the mechanisms of the
crisis was not official. Even if Western observers were prejudiced in favour of
their nations, it is obvious that aghas could and indeed were keeping wheat far
from the market until terms were extremely favourable for them. This would
be very easy especially if they were landlords themselves.76 It looks as if this was
not the case in 1740 but it was in 1755 and possibly many other times and in
many other places.77 It is also clear that through their own clients, the local
janissary companies, men not untouchable by market competition, or through
their links with the mob, they could initiate riots (or investigations) and to
direct them against the officials or the foreigners.78 If the kad› was weakened or
gone, then the control of the market and of the exports would be entirely in
their hands. Consequently they could approach navy officers and skip
searching for contraband, as they did in 1737.79 If the mob attacked the French,
then they – and the kad›, were he their ally – would be on the safe side. This is
why, I believe, there were riots in the Spring of 1755 but not in 1756, when the
janissaries were continuously in control of the market. The soft spot of the
aghas and of the janissary intervention was the management of the crises. They
never attacked the pasha, of course. But the situation could get out of hand, as
it did many times; and then some of them or their subordinates were bound to
feel the bowstring around their necks. They could fight back, sometimes they
did, but in the end this would only mean more capital punishments.
The leaders of all the guilds (kethuda) were counted among the leadership
of any town. It was only natural to be invited by the mütesellim Abd-ul-
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rahman Agha together with the aghas to discuss the management of the crisis.
Nouman Pasha would probably have done the same. Hunger was a threat
common to all professions and confessions. Linked but not always identified
with the aghas’ interests were those of two esnafs in particular, the bakers and
the millers. An 1802 agreement, drafted between these two then Christian
guilds and some Muslim guilds of the city, clarifies that traditionally millers
used to buy a fixed amount of wheat from the farmers; bakers – the Francs
included – were instructed to buy flour only from the millers. Any extra
quantities to reach the flour market ought to be handled by the guilds. Offering
to farmers prices higher that those fixed by the guild was discouraged.80 These
terms clearly suggest that some members of the guild or others had the
necessary capital to buy overpriced wheat, expecting somehow to sell it in the
town with profit, and they could possibly find buyers. It also suggests that some
bakers could do the same. But there was a high risk. A controlled crisis
therefore would be an ideal occasion for all speculators to be justified. Millers
could “encourage” the mollah for an increase in tariffs, as they did in 1753,
without the fear of any competition. They had the monopoly. Naturally bakers
would follow to bridge the gap to the extent this would be acceptable.81 When
they would all run out of supplies, then the overpriced wheat would be
marketed. If, under the circumstances of the crisis, the Francs were forced to
shut their bakeries, it would be even better. Local bakers, normally expecting
only limited margins of profit, would then take over the remunerative trade of
the hardtack.82 Hekimoglou has suggested, judging from the persons involved
in the aforementioned 1802 agreement, that these two Christian guilds might
have been under the patronage of Muslim, pseudo-janissary controlled guilds.83
If this is valid, which is hard to say for sure from the available evidence, then
the guilds’ lobbying was even more powerful. Even if it is not valid, we do know
that in the second half of the eighteenth century guilds had been infiltrated by
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pseudo-janissaries all around the Ottoman Balkans and indeed guildsmen
called themselves “janissaries”. However, the complete control of all trades and
professions by the military, according to Quataert, did not start much earlier
than the very late eighteenth or early nineteenth century.84
In any case, given this network of interests, the French and the other
exporting nations cannot be classified among the protagonists of the crises.
They were rather an indispensable part of the scenery. Their legal and illegal
exports contributed to the making of the crises but, considering the quantities
reserved for imperial needs, their contribution, with the notable exception of
1753, was rather marginal, even in the crucial period of 1739-1740. From the
consular correspondence used in this paper it becomes clear that the main
concern of both the consul and the Ottoman local officials was the bakeries of
the French and of the other communities rather than wheat exports. During
the actual days of the crisis, export was a thing of the past. Its value was highly
symbolic – stealing the local wealth – and exploitable but, nevertheless, past.
Rising profits from the sale of hardtack was an everyday issue for the local
bakers. French merchant houses were not present in the crisis mechanism since
they were de facto and de jure out of business. They were dragged in, however,
on three occasions, in 1739, 1740 and 1755, willy-nilly. In all cases they were
asked to provide wheat for the city at their own expense in order to save
themselves and the prestige of their Nation. In 1739 and in 1755 it was
promised that, if they succeeded in finding any, they would have the chance to
sell it with considerable profit. In 1740 the continuous arrivals of French vessels
with wheat were not accidental; nor was it the result of a negotiation which
freed tariffs, as has been suggested by Kostis.85 The triangular negotiation –
hardly a bargain – among the captain, the consul and the kad› shows that sales
lower than the local tariff could be profitable, if “honesty” prevailed. According
to Svoronos, in 1740 the average price of wheat in France was 64 paras.86 Even
if it was higher in some places, like Provence, still for the informed captains the
journey to Thessaloniki was shorter and an “honest” profit was secured at a
price of 50 paras per kile. In December 1739 this price was still ten per cent
cheaper than the local tariff, but it is reasonable to assume that in the following
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months the margins of profit widened. The involvement of the French derailed
the normal mechanisms of the crisis. It seems at a certain point, in April or in
May, that local “capitalists” tried to break the French import trade. The gaps
between the arrivals of wheat loads encouraged further speculation. The pasha
ignored their offer. His indifference to the hardships of his flock may have
contributed to taking a calculated risk and waiting for the French. Apparently
the Francs were more “honest” capitalists than the locals.
The famine of 1740 was an exceptional case not only for Thessaloniki but
for the whole Greek peninsula. To decide whether it was a crisis in social and
economic terms one should first define all the parameters, assuming that the
available information is all that mattered in the culmination of famine.  To start
with, Kostis was right to say that the city supplies had been exhausted in the
period 1738-1739. In 1738 the harvest was successful, but it should be kept in
mind that fewer fields had been given to cultivation in the nearby provinces. In
1739 the crop was less successful in the catchment area of Thessaloniki than in
∫avala. Moreover, shipments were sent, some to France and at least two to the
capital in August 1738 and in February 1739. In June 1738 the stock of supplies
had been exhausted and possibly it was not renewed in the following year. Only
millet was left in the warehouses. The French consul suspected that there were
hidden supplies, but he did not mention whether they ever appeared in the
market as he did in 1754. Given all these, the consul of Venice was hardly
justified to judge the shortage as “without explanation”. We now know for sure
that the climate in Spring 1739 had been far from favourable after all. Export
prices, given by the consuls, are not a safe index of crises. As already mentioned,
local prices for the making of flour were higher, the fluctuation of flour prices
varied independently, and, more significantly, the price of third-class grain and
flour increased more steeply than that of the other two classes. The steep rise
inevitably pushed all food prices higher and made them inaccessible.87 In any
case, the lower strata suffered the most, and this was the case in 1740 also. But
they did not revolt or demonstrate in spite of the constant threat. Were their
needs satisfied with the occasional arrival of a French ship? Apparently they
were not. People were starving to death. The prospect of a good crop coming
might have kept spirits high, at least from April onwards, even if we believe at
its face value Michael of Gora saying that snow fell – somewhere in Macedonia
– on the feast day of St George (23 April) and there were no green fields by
then.88 Evidence from 1754-1755 suggests that the prospect of a bad crop or a
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bad harvest could excite the mob and accelerate an outburst. It was natural to
happen, but this was not a decisive factor. How could people be so calm in
Spring 1740 when a “malignant fever” was tormenting their families? 
The reply has already been suggested above. What turned a shortage of
wheat and/or high prices into a general crisis was local politics rather than
hunger. Riots broke out after bad crops as in 1754, average crops as in 1739, or
good crops as in 1753 and 1758. So weather did not necessarily imply a
generalised crisis; nor did strategic provisions, at least not by themselves. There
was no uprising in Spring 1739, just murmurs, although wheat had been sent to
the capital twice during the previous months. And there would not have been
in June 1789 either, had the aghas decided to market their supplies in time. So,
if we consult our data, it is easy to realise that even in 1740 grain was somewhere
available and certainly not inaccessible. It might be that far as Anatolia, Syria or
North Africa; or even closer around the Aegean coast, at ∫avala, Volos or
Epanomi. It might even be locked up at state warehouses inside the town or at
private keeps outside the walls. Some of it might have been engaged for the army
or the capital but not irrevocably, as testify the cases of 1740 and 1754. Unlike
weather conditions and state provisions, exports – wholesale and/or the
provisioning of vessels – appear as a common factor in almost all crises
discussed. In 1739, 1753, 1754 and 1758, even in 1789, French and other wheat
exports could be accounted to varying degrees for the shortage that followed,
but the mob did not always turn against exporters.
What the mob saw as the main cause of all the crises was the kad› as an
unworthy regulator of tariffs and exports or even as a speculator. They could
not and they did not attack the aghas in 1739, 1755 and 1789, although there
were rumours, true or not, that they had ample reserves of wheat. Nor did the
kadı or the pasha ever turn the mob against them. This is the first indication
that the mob did not act spontaneously. The second indication is the timing of
the crisis. Grain supplies in pre-modern societies were exhausted in late Spring,
to be followed by riots and demonstrations. But in the case of Thessaloniki,
mutinies or protests also broke out in mid- or late Summer, as they did in 1739,
1753, 1755, 1758 and 1789, always due to rising prices; that is during the time
span when most of the wholesale transactions were taking place. A calculated
shortage pushed prices upwards. In other words, unlike 1740, the really hot
issue was not famine but pricing. Such Summer outbursts might also be seen
as pre-emptive strikes against the kadı In four out of five cases of Summer
encounters the mollah did not manage to recover his power. On three occasions
he was replaced within less than a year. The third indication that crises were
managed from the top is the city councils mentioned in November 1739,
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August 1753 and April 1755. It was then debated and decided collectively
whom to blame. If the kad› was the ally of the aghas, then the French and their
bakers, any Franc baker, were the only convincing alternatives. Such a
manœuvre would also require the involvement of the pasha, who had all the
good reasons to keep the janissary aghas on his side, the mob appeased, and the
French under his personal auspices. 
In all cases of wheat crises the underlying question was whether there was
real interest to transport supplies and when the right moment would be. The
answer was not an easy one since the individuals who were assigned to decide
had conflicting interests. If Thessaloniki, not alone of other Ottoman cities in
the eighteenth century, had been transformed into a plebeian republic, to use
McGowan’s term, then the mob could not have escaped its own transformation
into a lever of political pressure. If wheat crises were perfect occasions to make
maximum profits, then it was the right time for the mob to exercise its
maximum power. Although in many cases instigators of the riots are reported
– the putative janissaries and/or the guilds – probably they did not have much
more to do, if the crowd was really hungry and angry, than point their finger
at specific targets. Had the demonstration of women, in 1720, been instigated
by the aghas? Were the inhabitants capable of rising by themselves? The
authorities thought they were, and it looks as if public anger was taken into
consideration on various occasions; or was this alleged threat a pretext to hand
the problem of shortages over to the French? Considering the structure of
Thessaloniki’s urban society and all the evidence available about the network of
economic interests, it is almost inconceivable to exclude at any time any kind
of manipulation from above. Unfortunately it is also impossible to take into
account for the purpose of this paper personal relations – like the disruptive
role of the friendly aghas mentioned by the consul, personality issues, and,
most of all, the political networks connecting all the players to each other and
to their patrons in the capital.89 A complete picture is still desired.
For Michael of Gora, famine in 1740 was the result of the 1737 red comet
– known to astronomers as the comet Kegler. For the representative of Venice,
Francesco Muffati, God himself had inspired French captains to seek wheat
and bring it, one shipment after the other, into the Bay of Thessaloniki.90
God giveth; God taketh away. Wheat crises, not alone of all food crises, were
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certainly more complicated than that. If there was one God directly involved
in those tough days of Thessaloniki, deciding upon the fate of its Christian,
Muslim and Jewish dwellers, it was rather Mercury, the god of trade and
profit, inspecting the city from his quarters, at the opposite side of the gulf,
on Mount Olympus.
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